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SECTION 13 OF THE IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE:
IS THE POWER DELEGABLE?
N
Johannes Chan*
Section 13 of the Immigration Ordinance provides that the Director of Immigration
may authorise any person who landed in Hong Kong unlawfully to remain in Hong
Kong. In Lai Yau Chik v Director of Immigration, the Court of First Instance
recently held that this power could only be exercised by the Director of Immigration
personally. The court appears to have taken the view that the legislature intended to
exclude the general principle of delegation in this context. On its terms, this decision
has far-reaching consequences for a large number of Hong Kong citizens whose
permission to remain in Hong Kong was granted by lesser Immigration Department
officials. The author critically assesses this decision in light of the statutory scheme,
and the principles of devolution and delegation of statutory powers.
Introduction
Delegation is an inevitable aspect of modern administration. The sheer vol-
ume of administrative decisions means that a minister who is vested with
certain statutory powers has to delegate the exercise of those powers to his or
her subordinates or other public officers, in order to discharge his or her statu-
tory duties properly. The question in such cases is whether such statutory
power is delegable.
Section 13 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) provides:
"the Director may at any time authorise a person who landed in Hong
Kong unlawfully to remain in Hong Kong, subject to such conditions of
stay as he thinks fit, whether or not such person has been convicted of
that offence, and section 11(5), (5A) and (6) shall apply in the case of
any such person as it applies to a person who has been given permission to
land in Hong Kong under section 11(1)."
Section 11 deals with the permission to land. Section 7 provides that a
person may not land in Hong Kong without the permission of an immigra-
tion officer or immigration assistant unless he or she has a right to land. Under
section 2, "land" means "enter by land or disembark from a ship or aircraft".
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Once a person is given permission to land under section 11(1), an immigra-
tion officer or immigration assistant may give him or her permission to remain
in Hong Kong, subject to such limit of stay or such other conditions of stay as
may be imposed.' Landing in Hong Kong unlawfully means landing in or
entering Hong Kong in contravention of the Immigration Ordinance and
various other specified ordinances.2 Section 13 provides for the authority to
permit an illegal immigrant to remain in Hong Kong. The structure of the
ordinance shows that section 11 is designed to deal with persons who land
lawfully in Hong Kong (in the sense that permission to land has been given),
whereas section 13 caters for persons who enter Hong Kong unlawfully.
Lai Yau Chik v Director of Immigration
The facts of Lai Yau Chik v Director of Immigration' are uneventful. The appli-
cant was born on 10 June 1986 in mainland China. She applied for a certificate
of entitlement pursuant to section 2AA of the Immigration Ordinance on
the ground that she was a Chinese national born to a Hong Kong permanent
resident before 1 July 1997. The case turned on the status of the applicant's
father at the time of her birth. Her father obtained the status of permanent
resident of Hong Kong on account of seven years of ordinary residence in
Hong Kong. He came to Hong Kong illegally from mainland China on 18
April 1979. He applied to the Registration of Persons Department for an
identity card on 24 May 1979 and was allocated an identity card number on
the same day. Under the then prevailing "touch base policy", an illegal immi-
grant from mainland China would be permitted to remain in Hong Kong if
he or she reached the urban area of Hong Kong and found a home with rela-
tives or otherwise found proper accommodation.'
On 26 May 1979, the applicant's father obtained a clearance endorsement.
The record card relating to his identity card held in the Registration of Per-
sons Office carried a phrase that he was "cleared by Senior Immigration Office
on 26 May 1979". The Immigration Clearance Office Processing Form, which
was an internal document, also showed a recommendation by an immigra-
tion officer that the father had satisfied all the requirements of the touch base
policy and hence his case was cleared. A senior immigration officer put a tick
against the box "cleared ex China" and accepted the recommendation of the
t See s 11(1A).
2 See s 2(2).
Lai Yau Chik v Director of Immigration, unreported, HCAL No 288 / 2001, (Court of First Instance, 27
June 2001).
4 For the policy, see the speech of the Governor at the Legislative Council on 23 Oct 1980 (1980-81)
LegCo Proc 103. See also Hong Kong 1981 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1981), p 145, and
Attorney General v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 1 HKC 23 at 25. The policy, which took effect on 30 Nov
1974, was discontinued on 23 Oct 1980.
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immigration officer on 26 May 1987. The decision of the senior immigration
officer was approved by an Assistant Principal Immigration Officer
(Investigation Section) on 4 July 1979 and communicated to the applicant's
father on 9 July 1979. On the same day, the applicant's father was given an
entry permit. The issue for the court was to determine exactly when the seven
years of ordinary residence began. If it began to run either on 24 or 26 May
1979, he would have been a Hong Kong permanent resident when the appli-
cant was born; but not so if the seven years of residence only began to run on
either 4 or 9 July 1979.
The applicant relied on two main grounds to argue that her father was
granted permission to stay in Hong Kong either on 24 or 26 May 1979. First,
her father was given an endorsement of clearance on Form ROP 3b on 26
May 1979. The endorsement operated as permission to stay. Second, the in-
ternal document of the Immigration Department indicated that the father's
case was cleared on 26 May 1979. It is not in dispute that permission to re-
main can be given either expressly or by implication from words or conduct
falling short of an express permission.5
Yeung J held that time only began to run either from 9 July 1979, or at the
earliest from 4 July 1979 when the decision to allow the applicant's father to
stay was made. He reached this decision on the ground, inter alia, that inter-
nal clearance was made either by an immigration officer or a senior immigration
officer, who was not the "Director" within the meaning of the Immigration
Ordinance. Only the director can grant an illegal immigrant the authority to
remain in Hong Kong under section 13. Under section 2 of the Immigration
Ordinance, the term "Director" is defined to mean "the Director of
Immigration, the Deputy Director of Immigration and any assistant director
of immigration". Therefore, the judge held that:
"to suggest that the father had been granted the authority to remain in
Hong Kong by either Mr T C Chan, an immigration officer, or Mr C K
Siu, a Senior Immigration Officer on 26 May 1979 is a total disregard for
the statutory scheme within which immigration matters operate."6
Accordingly, the court held that the permission to remain in Hong
Kong was only granted on 4 July 1987 by the assistant principal immigra-
tion officer.
A difficulty with this line of reasoning is that the decision made on 4 July
1987 to permit the applicant's father to stay in Hong Kong was made by the
assistant principal immigration officer, who was also not an officer within the
5 See Re Wong Shu-hung and Immigration Tribunal [1985] HKLR 463.
6 See p 13 of the judgment.
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definition of the term "Director". Yeung J recognised this difficulty. He was
content to rely on the evidence of Mrs Hui on behalf of the Director of Immi-
gration before the Immigration Tribunal who said:
"it means that the case officer had put up the case to the proper authority
that is APAIO(I) that is the Assistant Principal Immigration Officer
(Investigation Section) to seek permission to allow Mr Lai to stay on
limitation."7
With respect, this explanation is hardly convincing. The evidence only
shows that the case officer had left it to the assistant principal immigration
officer to seek permission; it does not show that permission had been given by
the director. It is unfortunate that this aspect of the evidence was never
challenged. On the face of it, there is no evidence that permission was given by
the director.
Devolution of Power: The Carltona Principle
Leaving aside the evidential problem, the more profound implication of the
decision is that the power to grant permission to remain in Hong Kong under
section 13 can only be exercised by the director. This may have far reaching
consequences, as there are many cases under section 13 where the power to
grant permission to stay is exercised by an immigration officer. Given the
sheer number of illegal immigrants arriving in Hong Kong every year,8 it is
unthinkable that the power to grant permission to remain in Hong Kong to
each and every single illegal immigrant can only be exercised personally by
the Director of Immigration, even if one is prepared to extend the office to
cover the Deputy Director of Immigration and any assistant director of
immigration. It is submitted that the power contained in section 13 does not
have to be personally exercised by the Director of Immigration.
Where a statutory power is vested in a minister or a department of state
and is exercised by a departmental official, that official is regarded as the
alter ego of the minister or the department. Under the well-known Caritona
principle, the courts have recognised that "the duties imposed on Ministers
and the powers given to Ministers are normally exercised under the author-
ity of the Ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business
7 See p 14, para 59 of the judgment.
8 In the year 2000, on average, 23 illegal immigrants were arrested each day, making a total number of
8,395 arrested illegal immigrants. This represented a 30% drop from the 1999 figures. See Hong Kong
2000 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2001), p 419.
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could not be carried on if that were not the case."' Accordingly, the assis-
tant principal immigration officer, in approving the recommendation of
the senior immigration officer, was in fact exercising the power as the alter
ego of the Director of Immigration. Based on the above reasoning, it is dif-
ficult to see why the senior immigration officer, in accepting the
recommendation of the immigration officer and putting a tick against the
box "cleared ex China" on 26 May 1987, was not equally exercising the
power as the alter ego of the Director of Immigration.
The Carltona principle envisages that power is devolved." An alternative
justification for the decision is that the power under section 13 can be
delegated. According to section 43(3) of the Interpretation and General
Clauses Ordinance, where any ordinance confers any power upon a specified
public officer and such power is exercised by any other public officer, the
specified public officer shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have
delegated the latter public officer to exercise the power." Thus the Carltona
principle or the delegation principle provides a better explanation for the
decision. This approach also avoids the problem that some of the decisions
made under section 13 in the past may be open to challenge for want of
authority. The difficulty with this solution, however, is that neither the In-
terpretation and General Clauses Ordinance nor the Carltona principle can
displace clear statutory provisions. The Immigration Ordinance does draw a
distinction between an immigration assistant, an immigration officer, and
the Director.12 Indeed, the ordinance sets out clearly, albeit in a somewhat
unusual manner, the rank of officers that can exercise different types of power.
Thus, an immigration officer or a chief immigration assistant (but not a se-
nior or assistant immigration assistant) may, on the arrival of an aircraft in
Hong Kong, require the captain of the aircraft to furnish him or her with a
notice containing the names and nationalities of the crew and a notice con-
taining the prescribed particulars of the passengers." He or she may also
9 Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 at 563. See also Local Government Board v
Arlidge [1915] AC 120; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Oladehinde [1991] 1 AC
254.
10 Strictly speaking, under the Carltona principle, there is no delegation. An officer is not said to be a
delegate, but rather he is the alter ego of the minister or the department. Thus, a distinction is drawn
between devolution and delegation: see Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparte Oladehinde
[1991] 1 AC 254 at 283-4. In the Carltona situation, it is not necessary to show that the minister has
personally delegated his authority to the officer. The authority can be conveyed informally and gen-
erally by the officer's hierarchical superiors in accordance with departmental practice. See also de
Smith, Woolf and Jowell's, Principles of Judicial Review (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), pp 236-
237.
11 Cap 1, Laws of Hong Kong.
12 Under s 2, "immigration assistant" means any member of the Immigration Service of the rank of chief
immigration assistant, senior immigration assistant or immigration assistant. "Immigration officer"
means any member of the Immigration Service of or above the rank of assistant immigration officer.
13 See s 6(3).
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examine any person on arrival or landing in or prior to that person's depar-
ture from Hong Kong," but only the director may require the owner or the
captain of a ship or aircraft to produce for examination the passengers arriv-
ing or departing in that ship or aircraft." In a similar vein, an officer above
the rank of chief immigration officer may detain a person for not more than
48 hours, whereas further detention not exceeding five days can only be
authorised by an officer above the rank of principal immigration officer.'"
The Legislative Scheme: Contrary Intention?
In general, the legislative scheme seems to be devised in such a way that the
more important powers are reserved for the director alone. Thus, a removal
order should only be made by the director." While this is a laudable objective,
it gives rise to two problems.'
First, the distinction is not always rationally or consistently maintained.
For example, the director may impose conditions of stay under section 13,
yet an immigration officer or a chief immigration assistant may vary the
conditions.19 The chief executive may at any time vary any limit of stay in
force in respect of any person by curtailing the period during which such
person may remain in Hong Kong.' In such a case, the director, but not an
immigration officer or immigration assistant, must write to notify the person
affected of such variation. It is difficult to see why the duty to write to a
person whose conditions of stay have been varied by the chief executive should
fall on the director personally and cannot be discharged by his or her
subordinates. Nor can one see the rationale for the provision that applica-
tions from illegal immigrants to remain in Hong Kong must be personally
considered by the director and not by his or her subordinates, given the sheer
volume of such applications. The drafting is also inconsistent. For example,
whereas the term "Director" includes a Deputy Director of Immigration and
an assistant director of immigration, some provisions refer to the "Director of
14 See s 4(1).
15 See s 5(1).
16 See s 26.
17 See s 19. Section 19(6), which defines "Director" to include a Deputy Director and an assistant
director, seems redundant.
18 There could be a third problem. If the power vested in the Director can only be exercised by the
person holding that office, the reverse may also be true. Thus, if the statute confers a power on an
immigration officer, then in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the power can only
be exercised by that immigration officer. In exercising the statutory power, he is not bound by any
direction from his superior, including the Director of Immigration. This problem is resolved only by
s 52, which expressly provides that any immigration officer or immigration assistant shall, in the
exercise or performance of any powers, functions or duties under the Immigration Ordinance, com-
ply with the directions given by the Director of Immigration.
19 See ss 11(5A) and 13.
20 Sees 11(6).
21 See, eg ss 32(2A) and (3A), 53A, and 53B.
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Immigration, the Deputy Director of Immigration or any assistant director of
immigration"." Yet in other cases, it appears that "Director" must include an
officer acting on his or her behalf.22
Secondly, and more importantly, such a rigid and fine allocation of pow-
ers by statute may serve as a recipe for disaster in that the distinction may
easily be overlooked in the practical operation of the ordinance. For instance,
permission to land can be given either by an immigration officer or immigra-
tion assistant under section 11, whereas a refusal to give permission can only
be made by an immigration officer. Either an immigration officer or an immi-
grant assistant can impose a condition of stay,23 but such condition can only
be varied either by an immigration officer or a chief immigration assistant,
but not a senior immigration assistant or immigration assistant.' It would
not require a great deal of imagination to envisage situations where such a
hair-splitting distinction is overlooked in practice. To avoid such problems,
the legislature, in its recent amendment to provide for a certificate of
entitlement, now provides that a certificate of entitlement shall be consid-
ered by the director "acting through an immigration officer".25 While this
formulation will avoid accidental oversight in practice, it also reinforces the
view that the term "Director" in other contexts in the Immigration Ordi-
nance can only mean the director personally.
Conclusion
The case of Lau Yau Chik highlights that the right of abode of many Hong
Kong permanent residents who came to Hong Kong illegally and were per-
mitted to remain in Hong Kong under section 13 might be invalid. It is most
unfortunate that the court does not seem to have considered the question of
delegation of power at all. The case also shows that the problem could affect
the residency status of the children of those immigrants. It is unsatisfactory
that an important right such as the right of abode should be dependent on
who exercised the power to grant permission to remain in Hong Kong many
years ago. To the persons affected, it makes no difference whether the permis-
sion was given by the director or by one of the immigration officers. It may
come as a shock, therefore, to learn many years later that one's permission to
22 See s 36(1), which provides that an immigration officer and any police officer may require a person
who is detained to enter into a recognisance with such number of sureties as the Director or such
police officer may reasonably require. The reference to the "Director" in this case must be wide
enough to cover an immigration officer, especially when a police officer can decide whether
recognisance is required and the number of sureties that is required. Similarly, in ss 36(3) and 37F,
the reference to an application by the Director can only be a reference to the office, the power of
which can be delegated, and not to the officer personally.
23 See s 11(1).
24 Sees 11(5A).
25 See ss 2AB(6), 2AC(6).
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remain in Hong Kong was given by the wrong officer of the state and is there-
fore invalid. To some extent, the problem lies in legislative drafting as well.
The inconsistent drafting may well be a result of piece-meal amendments
that were made to the Immigration Ordinance over a long period of time
rather than a deliberate decision to draw up a fine legislative scheme for allo-
cation of power. It is unfortunate that the solution adopted for the certificate
of entitlement scheme is not applied in other contexts. There is an urgent
need here for legislative action to rationalise the exercise of powers under the
Immigration Ordinance.
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